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Abstract
In a framework where deregulating the electric power market is an objective to be achieved, this
thesis investigates how the transmission rules chosen by the regulator to deregulate this market
will shape the incentives given to the market players and influence their market power. To study
this influence, it is challenging the perfect market assumptions and examining how physical and
financial rights on the transmission grid will affect the efficiency of two of the formal
components of the market for electric power, the market for energy itself and the market for
transmission.
It is first shown how transmission constraints can create locational market power in
network economies, and how loop flow increases dramatically this problem in electric power
networks. Classical oligopolistic competition models are investigated. It suggests that in a
Bertrand competition framework, which seemed more adequate than a Cournot competition for
describing short-term behavior, tacit collusion can take place. This is further encouraged by
transmission constraints and short-term spot markets. Moreover, financial rights, used for
hedging against transmission cost or for funding the grid expansion, can create long term and
short term detrimental incentives especially, but not exclusively, if their revenue depends on the
ex-post prices or flows on the market.
In the second part, a number of general policy recommendations are discussed and it is
shown, from an analytical point of view, how they could reduce some of the imperfections
described in the first part. It is shown how the duration of the contracts between sellers and
buyers has a direct effect on sustainability of tacit collusion and how, under certain general
conditions, tacit collusion is not sustainable if this duration is above seven years. Most
importantly, it will be proposed that financial instruments for grid expansion that yields a
revenue depending on the ex-ante characteristics of the market can be effective to reduce the
general problem of locational market power. A simulation of a 24-bus system is used to illustrate
this last point as well as to show how loop flows create locational market power.
The implementation of the policy recommendations that were analytically found useful
is discussed. They are compared to other methods to reduce market power, and their
implementation is shown to be realistic if a centralized body is to plan the investments in the
transmission grid. Specific examples of already deregulated or to be deregulated markets for
electric power are discussed to illustrate this matter.
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1. Introduction
1.1 An efficient deregulation
A change in technology or a shift in its policy may lead a government toward deregulating
industries that were considered until then to be natural monopolies or strategic in terms of
national security. New technologies that have reduced the critical size of a generation unit, as
well as a general trend toward economic liberalization, are pushing an increasing number of
countries to deregulate their electric power industries. When choosing the path toward
deregulation, the regulator must keep in mind the two criteria that the future deregulated market
should meet in order to be efficient. It must first provide the decision-makers with the
information they need to take decisions but also produce the incentives that will have them take
the optimal ones.
In a perfect market, as defined in any handbook of microeconomics, it is the unique
equilibrium price of the market that conveys information about marginal costs and marginal
utilities and provides the appropriate incentives to the market participants to set their own
marginal cost or utility in order to maximize the total social welfare.
A deregulated electric power market, with its three components, generation, transmission,
and distribution, is not a perfect market. The transmission network creates externalities on the
generation side if its value is not reflected in the prices paid to generators; constraints on the
transmission lines create network externalities, as the actions of a generator might affect the
ability of other generators to take similar actions. The simplest market mechanisms fail to
produce a unique price that provides the market participants with the appropriate information
about the capacity of the transmission network and incentives not to abuse this network. If a
government is decided to deregulate its electric power industry, it seems reasonable that the
market players should be prevented, through appropriate market rules, from excessively abusing
the market imperfections.
One of the major focuses of the economic debate that the future deregulation has first
initiated was about finding means to process the information and generate appropriate pricing of
transmission that would internalize the externalities produced by the transmission network. We
can observe two opposite trends in the methods that have been proposed, both acknowledging
that generators and consumers know their own costs and utilities, and the operator of the
transmission grid, or what is often called the Independent System Operator (ISO), has the
information about the transmission capacity of the network. The first trend, illustrated by Hogan
(1992) (Harvard University), advocates centralizing information about the generation cost and
consumers' utility through bids submitted to an ISO that would calculate appropriate transactions
and prices, the prices being different at every node of the network. At MIT, Ilic (1997a) favors
decentralizing information about the transmission network by providing market participants with
transmission costs and having them decide what transactions will take place. A number of other
proposals offered compromises between these two extremes; Wu and Varaiya (1995) from
Berkeley have advocated, for example, a market mechanism with multiple stages and different
rules at every stage'.
The underlying assumption behind all of these proposals is that the market participants
are price takers and, therefore, that the pricing methods they advocate will produce automatically
the appropriate incentives. It is this assumption that this thesis challenges. Its main message is
that, if the industry is to be deregulated, transmission constraints can amplify dramatically the
problems of market power and the regulator can design the transmission strategy in order to
reduce this phenomenon.
1.2 Contributions and outline
This thesis can be divided into two main parts, each one conveying half of the message. In the
first part it is shown how the physical laws on the transmission grid (chapter 2) and the
associated financial instruments (chapter 3) can amplify market power and create market
imperfections. The second part demonstrates how the rules that will govern transmission of
electric power between generators and consumers can be chosen in order to reduce these
imperfections (chapter 4) and discusses their implementation (chapter 5).
Chapter 2 introduces the problem by highlighting briefly, through a simple example, the
need of different prices at different nodes of the network in order to internalize the externalities
created by the transmission grid. It then shows with another simple example, as well as a more
elaborated simulation of a 24-nodes system, how transmission constraints and loop flow can
create geographically localized markets, relevant from an Antitrust point of view. Most
importantly, these sub-markets might be relevant while still connected by non-constrained lines
to the rest of the network. The market participants can have significant locational market power
in these relevant sub-markets. In order to predict the type of behavior that is to be expected in
these sub-markets, the thesis examines different types of oligopolistic models that could be used.
It concludes that supply function competition, and Bertrand competition with increasing
marginal costs or generation capacity constraints, describe more accurately than Cournot
competition the short term strategic behavior of the market participants. This chapter finally
finds that tacit collusion between the generators might be sustainable if a spot market with
posted daily bids is created by the regulator.
Chapter 3 exposes some of the detrimental incentives that financial instruments might
give to the market participants. It first explains the need for financial instruments to hedge
against the volatility of transmission costs and to finance investments in new transmission lines.
These types of financial instruments are known to potentially produce incentives to detrimental
investments in the transmission grid (Bushnell et al., 1996). This chapter shows how they can
also induce strategic bidding on the short term and sub-optimal investment in generation
capacity on the long term. These problems of moral hazard are found to be more pronounced
when the revenues yielded by these financial instruments depend on the real flows through the
transmission network.
See Ilic et al (1997b) for a comparative presentation of these three methods.
Chapter 4 shows how the physical and financial markets for transmission can be designed
in order to reduce the imperfections highlighted in the two previous chapters. On the physical
market for transmission, it is shown that when access to transmission can be guaranteed for a
long term, and when the market participants do not have to make their transactions through a
spot market, tacit collusion should not be sustainable. Concerning financial instruments, this
chapter suggests that hedging instruments sold by an independent insurance agency are less
susceptible to produce moral hazard than those distributed by an independent system operator.
The latter should rather use the merchandising surplus, collected as a congestion rent, to fund the
financial instruments for grid expansion in order to reduce the economic distortion due to
economies of scale and the constraint of an equilibrated budget and. Finally, and most
importantly, this chapter presents the result of a simulation that shows how an expansion policy
for the transmission grid that relies on ex-ante characteristics of the market can be effective to
reduce the general problem of locational market power introduced in chapter 2.
In fifth chapter, the implementation of the policy recommendations that were
analytically found useful in chapter 4 is discussed. It first explains why other methods to reduce
market power, as price caps and multiplication of ownership, have serious limitations for the
electric power industry. The policy recommendations are then exposed and their implementation
discussed. Specific examples of already deregulated or to be deregulated markets for electric
power are given as an illustration.
In the conclusion, I will discuss how environmental constraints or the time gap between
planning and executing a network expansion can reduce the credibility of a threat of network
expansion and indicate why the use of FACTS technologies can help restore this credibility.
The remainder of the present chapter gives the definitions of physical and financial rights
used in this thesis.
1.3 Definitions
We find in the literature too many distinct concepts when using the phrases "physical rights" and
"financial rights," and when speaking about the transmission grid. We will try here to separate
these concepts and to highlight some of their characteristics.
1.3.1 Physical rights
1.3. 1.1 Definition of physical rights used in this thesis
To implement a power market, electric power must be injected into a transmission system,
transmitted by it, and taken out (ejected). The right and obligation to implement these processes
are referred to here as physical injection, transmission and ejection rights2. They match
exactly, and in real time, flows into, through and out of the transmission grid.
1.3. 1.2 Options on physical rights
We contrast this definition of physical rights with the same term, used in various discussions.
"Physical rights" is sometimes used to mean short or long term contracts that give to their owner
a certain priority (depending on whether they are firm or interruptible contracts) for acquiring
physical injection, transmission, or ejection rights. We will refer to those contracts as "options
on physical rights." These options can be tradable among the market participants.
2 As an abbreviation for Physical Right and Obligation we use Physical Right.
1.3.1.3 Implicit or explicit physical rights?
Under certain of the proposed deregulation methods, physical rights can be defined explicitly
and traded or distributed by an Independent System Operator (ISO) in such a way that no
transaction of power can take place if it is not associated with corresponding physical rights.
Therefore the allocation of physical rights must follow a feasibility rule that respects the
constraints imposed by the grid. An example is the nodal prices model developed by Hogan
(1992), in which an ISO mandates what every generator is to inject, i.e., distributes the injection
rights. In other models, the market mechanisms might determine the transactions without dealing
explicitly with physical rights, but these rights are always implicitly defined and associated to
real flows, which are authorized by the ISO or agreed upon by all market participants. Even
though the rights are not explicitly defined, they play a major role since the implicit rights still
have to respect the feasibility rule.
1.3.2 Financial rights
Financial rights, as opposed to physical rights, are not an integral part of implementing power
markets and do not give any right over or obligation to the physical flow of power. Rather, they
are financial instruments designed artificially and sold or distributed to market participants or to
investors in the grid by an ISO or by independent insurance agencies. The revenues they provide
to their owners are usually linked to some of the characteristics of the market for power
(basically prices and/or quantities).
As for physical rights, financial rights can be explicitly defined or implicitly defined. We
will discuss this point later, when we introduce the "merchandising surplus" in section 3.1
2. Imperfections in the physical market
Combined cycle technologies, and other new technologies in the generation of electric power,
have reduced the economies of scale in this sector, together with the critical size of a single
generation unit, enabling the multiplication of generators and reducing their individual market
power3 . This phenomenon is expected to facilitate the emergence of a competitive generation
market and is one of the major arguments in favor of deregulating the electric power industry.
Without transmission constraints and losses, the market for generation would have a unique
equilibrium price and the features of a classical perfect or oligopolistic market, and a reduction
in the critical size of a generator should definitely improve the competitiveness of the market.
Nevertheless, because of loop flow, transmission constraints, and other network externalities, the
electric power market is unique and the impact of the transmission grid on the market power of
the generators should be studied carefully and without prejudice.
The electricity market as seen by distributors and main loads can be conceptually
separated into two distinct markets: The "market for generation" itself, and the "market for
physical transmission rights" to transmit the energy bought in the first market from the seller to
the buyer. Depending on the market structure, these two functions will be bundled or unbundled,
but can always be separated, at least conceptually, in the analysis of any proposed market
structure. It is necessary to understand the respective impacts of these two markets on the prices
seen by the consumers and on the market power whose consequences distributors and loads
might have to bear and that can be originated in each one of them, and must be treated
accordingly. One of the major claims of this chapter is that while the size of the market
participants tends to give them the power to influence the price of generation itself, their location
tends to give them the power to influence the price of transmission, i.e., the price of physical
rights. This phenomenon can produce geographically localized zones where individual
generators can have significant market power, and raises new challenges to the ongoing
deregulation; local oligopolies and tacit collusive behavior are only two examples of such
challenges.
2.1 Introduction: The need for spatial differentiation
2.1.1 Nodal pricing
A unique uniform electricity price is unable to provide appropriate signals to the market
participants because of the externalities produced by the transmission network. Schweppe et al.
(1988) have shown in the context of a vertically integrated industry how it is possible to
'The market power of a generator is its ability to profitably maintain prices above the competitive level.
calculate a set of 'nodal prices', one for every node at the network, that would theoretically
maximize the social welfare. The difference in prices between two nodes reflects the
transmission costs, which are costs of losses on the transmission lines and opportunity costs due
to congestion on some of these lines.
As a simple example, we can consider a three-node network without losses with three
identical transmission lines, the maximum transmission capacity of every line being 5 units of
power. We have on this network two generators, G1 and G2, with constant marginal costs of 1
and 2 units of costs respectively, and one load, L, with an inelastic demand of 10 units of power.
Node 3, load L
2/3 ql 1/3 ql
1/3 ql
Node 1, generator G1 Node 2, generator G2
Figure 1: Nodal pricing
Because of loop flow, 2/3 of the output q1 of GI will flow on line 1-3 and 1/3 will flow
on lines 1-2 and 2-3. Therefore, generator Gi cannot satisfy alone the needs of load L because
the line 1-3 would be operating outside its constraint. When generator G2 is also producing, 1/3
only of its output q2 will flow on line 1-2: substituting partially G2 to G1 will reduce the flow on





gives the optimal physical dispatch:
(3) ql=5 and q2=5
The nodal prices P1, P2, and P3 at nodes 1, 2 and 3 respectively are the shadow prices of
the system:
(4) P= 1, P2=2, P3=3.
It is interesting that the nodal prices 1 and 2 are equal to the marginal costs of the
generators at these nodes. Moreover, the nodal price at node three is greater than the marginal
cost of the most expansive generator: In order for the load to get 1 more unit of power, and
because of loop flow, we must reduce the output of Gi by 1 and increase the output of G2 by 2.
The marginal cost to the system is therefore 3 units of cost.
Hogan has proposed, in one of the paper that has the most influenced the economic debate
in this field (Hogan, 1992), that this method should be used in the deregulated electric power
market. The market participants were to reveal to an Independent System Operator (ISO) their
cost and utility functions and this ISO would calculate the optimal transactions and the nodal
prices.
2.1.2 From uniform to nodal pricing
One of the open questions concerning pricing for transmission system support at times of
scarcity is related to the tradeoff between simplicity and accuracy in generating accurate price
signals. The proposals range from uniform, to zonal and nodal pricing. Uniform pricing
advocates pro rata shares of costs created by congestion by all system users (loads). It is simple
but it does not reflect locational and temporal differences in system use, and, consequently, does
not create appropriate incentives to ration the system adequately.
In contrast to this approach, stands the nodal pricing approach, that we have described in
the last section, which requires extensive computation and measurements to differentiate the
locational aspect of system use.
The idea of zonal pricing recognizes the different locational impact of various users, but
advocates an aggregation of customers into "zones". All customers in the same zone pay the
same price.
2.1.3 An example
The danger of zonal pricing is an oversimplification that would lead to serious inefficiencies. An
example is given by the Rainbow Strawman Proposal, made by the Boston Edison Corporation to
the New England Regional Transmission Group. This proposal advocates the creation of
"constrained" and "non-constrained" zones where the loads of the constrained zones would split
proportionally the out-of-merit generation cost occurring in their zone. Splitting the constraints'
costs between the loads proportionally to their consumption is equivalent to saying that the nodal
prices these loads are paying are equal. But if Hogan's nodal prices in the constrained area are
not equal (and because of loop flow there is no reason for them to be equal), the Rainbow
Strawman will send price signals that shift the system away from the economic optimum.






Figure 2: Zonal pricing, a simplification of nodal pricing
But in the following configuration, the prices paid by loads L1 and L2 should be




Figure 3: Zonal pricing can be an oversimplification
The boundary case is a constrained area completely separated from the unconstrained area,
where all loads would be paying the same price for power.
In fact, the proposal assumes that there is a well-defined constrained interface and
constrained area, and that there are no constraints inside this constrained area. This is not true, a
priori, unless the zones are chosen adequately and differentiated and modified with the evolution
of the market conditions
2.2 Locational market power exists
The nodal pricing proposal advocated by Hogan (1992) has been frequently criticized because it
ignores the potential market power that the market participants can have in such a framework.
Singh, Hao and Papalexopoulos (1997) show how, with location-dependent nodal spot pricing
and transmission constraints, a non-discriminating auction mechanism creates opportunities for
strategic behavior. Nevertheless, the problem of market power lies beyond the auction
mechanism or the features of the nodal pricing model. More generally, in any market structure
that tries to give rational economic signals to every market participant, i.e., a structure that
recognizes spatial differentiation (section 2.1), generators in areas constrained by weak
transmission lines do see their market power boosted because they are isolated, by the
constraints, from the competition of other generators. This problem should not disappear, for
example, in Berkeley's proposal (Wu et al., 1995) of multilateral markets where a few isolated
generators in a constrained area will still have significant power in multilateral negotiations, or
in any other method that recognizes spatial differentiation.
To illustrate this phenomenon, we use a simple model where two generators GI and G2
and an aggregated load L are isolated from the rest of the network by a constrained line whose
maximum capacity is K. P and A are respectively the electricity prices in the constrained and
unconstrained areas and d(P) is the demand of the load L.
Constrained Area, Price P





Figure 4. Market Power Due to Transmission Constraints
The market in the constrained area is similar to a duopoly with a competitive fringe where
the fringe has a constant marginal cost L and a maximum production capacity K. As long as the
price P is above 4, the line is constrained and the generators GI and G2 are facing a demand
d'(P)=d(P)-K. They will act in this case as a perfect duopoly facing the new demand d', with full
market power that this situation gives them.
Nevertheless, a constrained zone completely isolated by a constrained line is exceptional;
more generally, the transmission lines are constrained because of loop flows and there might
always be a path of non-constrained transmission lines between constrained and non-constrained
generators. To find out whether transmission constraints could still induce local market power in
this general scenario, we have simulated the realistic IEEE reliability system (IEEE, 1979) using
a modified version of a software developed by Macan (1997). This system consists of 24 nodes,
38 transmission lines, 19 inelastic loads, and 14 generators with quadratic cost functions and
finite generation constraints located at 10 nodes.
Using a nodal pricing method a la Hogan and assuming that the generators are
communicating their cost functions4 to a central Independent System Operator, the software
calculates the socially optimal dispatch, the nodal prices at the generation nodes, and the profits
of every generator. It is straightforward to conclude that in a competitive market the generators
will maximize their profits by communicating their true cost functions. Nevertheless, the number
of generators is finite and every one of them has the power to influence the nodal price and
sometimes to raise its profits by cheating on its cost function. The goal of our simulation was to
examine how transmission constraints can influence this power and whether they can raise it
locally, producing sub-markets that are relevant from an Industrial Organization point of view 5
4 The cost function coefficients may be estimated on the base of price bids.
As posed by G. Werden (1996), from the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, a group of products and
geographical areas constitute a relevant market when a monopolist could exercise significant market power over
them, and significant market can be defined in terms of the price increase that a monopolist would impose. As an












Five transmission lines (lines 7 and 14 through 17), separating the network in two distinct
sub-networks, can potentially be constrained while all other lines are operating far from their
limits. We consider three different levels of demand. At the first level, only line 7 is constrained;
at the second, lines 7 and 16 are constrained. At the third demand level, lines 7 and 17 are
constrained while line 14 is operating so close to its limit that some generators can cause it to be
constrained by changing their bids. For every demand level, we have raised by 10% the cost
function processed by the ISO of every one of the fourteen generators, leaving the costs of the
other thirteen unchanged, and observed which nodal prices where sensitive to which costs. This
experiment has suggested that nodes 1, 2 and 7, where generators 2, 3, 11, 12, and 4 are located,
could constitute a potentially relevant market.
Figure 6. A Relevant Sub-Market of the IEEE 24-Bus Reliability System
To confirm this suggestion, we have raised by 10% the bids of these five generators
together as a monopoly could do (cf. the definition of a relevant market), with (Table 1) and
without (Table 2) transmission limits on the five critical transmission lines. The following two
tables summarize the increases in prices and profits that this 10% increase in bidding has
produced in the two cases.
Demand Lines that are PRICES Aggregated profits
level constrained Node 1 Node 2 Node 7 Ranges for other nodes at nodes 1, 2, and 7
1 7 5.7% 5.4% 4.9% -1.3% to 3% +17%
2 7,16 9.8% 9.7% 10.3% -0.6% to 1.4% +26.3%
3 7,17,(14)6 9.2% 9.3% 10% -1.4% to 0.2% +18.5%
Table 1. Changes in prices and profits with transmission constraints
6 Line 14 becomes only constrained after the generators raise their price.
Demand Lines that are PRICES Aggregated profits
level constrained Node 1 Node 2 Node 7 Ranges for other nodes at nodes 1, 2, and 7
1 none 1.3% 0.7% 1.1% 0.5% to 1% +1%
2 none 1.3% 1.2% 1.3% 0.8% to 0.9% +2%
3 none 3.1% 3.2% 2.9% 2.3% to 2.6% +6.9%
Table 2. Changes in prices and profits without transmission constraints
It is clear from these results that the generators that are at nodes 1, 2, and 7 constitute a
relevant market for the three levels of demand, especially for levels 2 and 3. Moreover, it appears
that it is the transmission constraints that are making this market relevant in the first and second
levels of demand, since removing the transmission constraints dilutes the market power of these
generators by putting them directly in competition with the other generators on the network. We
will further note that their size is contributing to their market power in the third level of demand
where they have significant market power in the absence of transmission constraints because the
cheap generators that are competing with them are already working at their full capacity. In all
three levels, locational market power is created by the "market for physical transmission rights"
because of the particular location of the relevant sub-market. In the third level of demand, the
"market for generation" is raising the generators' global market power because of their size and
cost functions. It is of primary importance that, in the first and second levels of demand,
respectively only one and two lines are constrained out of the five that separate the sub-market
from the rest of the network, and that these constraints are raising the market power by an order
of magnitude. This indicates that lines constrained by loop flows can produce sub-markets that
are relevant markets from an economic point of view while these sub-markets are still connected
by many other non-constrained transmission lines to the rest of the network. Locational market
power created by transmission constraints, a classical problem in almost all network economies,
is thus increased dramatically by loop flows, the specificity of electric power networks. Finally,
it is interesting that the level of demand affects the "degree of relevance" of sub-markets;
markets that are not relevant in off-peak periods could become relevant in peak periods and we




As we have seen in the last section, locational market power will exist because of loop flows and
transmission constraints that produce geographically and temporally localized relevant markets.
Moreover, global market power can also exist, transmission constraints put apart, because of the
relative size of a competitor as shown by the experience of deregulation in the British electric
power market (Wolfram, 1995). Therefore, one should not assume, a priori, that the market is
perfect, but rather take the potential existence of market power into consideration in any form of
proposed deregulation and try to limit this power. To do this, we will have to replace our
traditional assumptions of a perfect market with a more realistic oligopolistic model.
The type of oligopolistic model that is adapted to study the type of oligopolistic
competition depends on the future rules of the market that the regulator will choose. In a
centralized market, where an ISO takes the bids of the generators and loads and decides what the
physical dispatch will be, the type of competition is exogenous and depends on the bidding
procedure. When the generators are bidding prices and the ISO deciding for quantities, the
competition will be a Bertrand competition. When the generators are to bid their production
levels as a function of the price, the equilibrium prices will then be given by the "supply function
equilibrium" developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and applied to the British power market
by Green and Newberry (1992). The equilibrium price will then lie above those yielded by a
Bertrand competition and beneath those given by a Cournot competition in the unlikely case
where the generators are bidding quantities only.
In a decentralized market where the transactions are settled in bilateral and multilateral
markets, the type of competition is endogenous and probably not unique7 . One of the most
classical oligopolistic models is the Cournot model where the firms compete by choosing the
quantity they want to put on the market and an independent auctioneer sets the price that clears
the market. Well adapted to study long-term competition and barriers for entry, Cournot
competition models are useful in scenarios where the firms first commit themselves to a
production capacity and compete next by choosing prices in a second period. This is based on the
fact that in a two-periods game where rigid capacities are chosen in the first period, the
competition by prices (Bertrand competition) in the second period yields the same results given
by a one-period game where the strategic variable chosen by the firms is their output (Cournot
competition) and the price is settled by an independent auctioneer (Kreps and Schneikman,
1983). Therefore, the Cournot competition model might be adapted to examine generation
competition in a long term strategic interaction framework where the generators have to choose
their generation capacity a la Cournot before competing ' la Bertrand every day. Nevertheless,
besides some specific cases (the oil market in certain periods of its history for example),
competition by quantities is fairly unrealistic to analyze short-term competition. This is
especially true in decentralized multilateral and bilateral electric power markets where firms will
bid rarely for quantities only and where the central auctioneer that sets the price does not exist.
One could argue in favor of using Cournot competition to determine what happens on a daily
basis since it is supposed to give the expected output of a Bertrand competition in the "second
period". Nevertheless, this rationale makes two very strong and unrealistic assumptions: The
demand characteristics should be the same in the "second period" as those expected when the
capacity choices were made. They should also be fairly stable in the very short term to enable us
to use the long-term expected outcome (the outcome of the two-stage Cournot competition) and
interpret what happens on an hourly basis. Therefore, this model seems unable to give valuable
insights on the short-term (hourly, daily) competition in a generation market where demand is
highly volatile and competition is primarily by price.
A more adapted alternative for short-term analysis is the classical Bertrand oligopolistic
competition model where the strategic variables are the prices that each competing firm chooses
to maximize its profit, considering as fixed the prices of its competitors. Under this model, the
equilibrium price will be the marginal cost of production when the products are undifferentiated,
the firms can serve all the demand they face at a constant marginal price, and the players are
assumed to play once. This result, combined with the observation that the prices on the British
electric power market are above marginal prices has sometimes been used to reject this
competition model in favor of a Cournot competition (Oren, 1997). Nevertheless, Edgeworth
(1897) has shown that, if no single firm can serve all the demand, the output of a Bertrand
competition with production capacity constraints is no longer competitive and the equilibrium
price can go above the marginal cost. As reported by Tirole (1988), this result is valid in the
7 However, it might be affected by the rules adopted by the ISO to have the players respect the transmission constraints:
Curtailment of output, surcharges for using constrained lines, etc.
more general context of price competition between firms with increasing marginal costs. It is due
to the fact that at the competitive price, every firm has an incentive to raise its price, its
competitors being on their supply curve and not willing to supply more to make up for the deficit
in offer (as opposed to the situation with constant marginal cost). Even when the marginal prices
are assumed to be constant, the electric power generators have generation constraints and no
single one can always serve all the demand it faces. Therefore, the price competition model is
not to be rejected but its results must be interpreted in the context of generation capacity
constraints and increasing marginal costs.
While a Bertrand competition model could be used, the supply function model
(Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Green and Newberry, 1992), where generators bid both prices and
quantities, can constitute a credible alternative. This is especially true in a highly decentralized
market where the prices of the transaction are not public and where large customers are likely to
obtain better prices than smaller ones. In a decentralized market, we are likely to observe a
combination of Bertrand competition and supply function competition in the different geographic
and temporal relevant sub-markets.
However, none of the models we discussed takes into consideration the repeated nature of
the interactions between the players. When this interaction is periodic, and especially in a
centralized scheme where the prices are public, one could observe inter-temporal Nash strategies
where tacit collusion is enforced by retaliation threats.
2.3.2 Tacit collusion
Chamberlain (1929) suggested that within a framework of oligopolistic competition and
homogenous good, market participants, because of the threat of price war, could sustain a
monopoly price without explicit collusion. Friedman's Folk Theorem (1971) illustrates how tacit
collusive behavior can appear in the context of an infinity of repeated basic games with price
competition (Bertrand supergame). This theorem states that any average payoff vector that is
better for all players than the Nash equilibrium payoff vector of the basic game can be sustained
as the outcome of a perfect equilibrium. Under certain conditions, betting for example the
monopoly price as long as all other players do the same, and coming back indefinitely to the
Nash bet of the single stage game after any deviation, can be a Nash strategy in the framework of
the inter-temporal infinitely repeated game. The electric power market seems, unfortunately, to
constitute a credible candidate for tacit collusion.
To illustrate this claim, we will consider a model similar to that of Brock and Schneikman
(1985) where N generators with a constant marginal cost c and a production capacity k are facing
a demand q given by q = a - p. p is the price and a is a coefficient larger than c. The generators
are competing by prices in an infinitely repeated game. In a one-shot game, the equilibrium
would be a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium (BNE) of pure or mixed strategies8 . In the repeated game,
the generators can either choose to collude at the monopoly price or to proceed with a price war
and stay at the BNE that yields the lowest possible price. At every stage of the repeated game,
every generator chooses to collude by bidding the monopoly price and sharing the demand with
the others, to defect by bidding a price that is slightly under the monopoly price and producing at
its full capacity, or to play the one-stage Bertrand Nash strategy if he is expecting other
generators to do the same. By using the results reported by Brock and Shneikman (1985), we can
easily calculate the benefits that every generator will get at every period from colluding (function
C(N,k)), defecting (D(N,k)) or staying at the BNE (B(N,k)).
8 For (a-c)/(N+1)<k<(a-c)/(N-1) there exists no pure strategy, i.e., the equilibrium bidding prices are random variables.
* For k<(a-c)/2N, the total capacity is under the monopoly capacity, the generators will always
produce at full capacity and their individual profit is C(N,k)=D(N,k)=B(N,k)=k(a-c-N.k).
* For k>(a-c)/2N,
- the individual profit from collusion is the shared monopoly profit (a-c)2/4N,
- the profit from defection is k(a-c)/2 if k<(a-c)/2 and (a-c)2/4 otherwise,
- the profit in a BNE is k.(a-c-N.k) for k<(a-c)/(N+J), 0 for k>(a-c)/(N-1) and ((a-c)-(N-
1).k)2/4 otherwise 9.
In this Bertrand supergame, a possible trigger strategy for every generator is colluding
while all other generators are colluding and playing infinitely the simple Bertrand Nash bid after
observing the first defection.
Individual Profits





C: Profits from colluding
B: B ertrand-Nash Profits
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Figure 7: Individual Profits from Colluding, Defecting, or Staying at the One-Stage Equilibrium
Colluding will be a sustainable behavior when this strategy is a Nash strategy, i.e., when
the profits from defecting in one period are smaller than the discounted future profits that a
generator will loose by defecting, or, r being the discount rate and T the period between two
interactions,
(5) D(N, k) - C(N, k) (C(N, k) - B(N, k)) -exp(-rTi)
9 As we have mentioned earlier, it is the existence of generation capacity limits that enables the generators to sustain a
price that is above the marginal cost in a one stage Bertrand competition.
C(N,k)-B(N,k)(6) D(N, k)- C(N, k) <
exp(rT) - 1
The trigger strategy is a Nash strategy when this inequality holds and collusion at the
monopoly price would then be a sustainable equilibrium for the N generators. More sophisticated
strategies can be imagined to make sure that an accidental deviation does not bring the system
indefinitely to the single game Nash equilibrium, the key conditions remain however that no
player should be able to make any benefit from defecting and the threat of price war must be
credible.
Tacit collusion can appear in the framework of a Bertrand or a supply function
competition (or even a Cournot competition) and its real danger lies in the Nash quality of its
equilibrium that confers it stability since nobody has an incentive to cheat unlike in classical
cartel behavior. Furthermore, tacit collusion does not necessitate the communication channels
that cartelisation needs and will therefore rise more easily and be more difficult to prove and
monitor by regulators.
Tacit collusion is rather an unusual phenomenon but a centralized framework where
posted daily or hourly bids of generators are managed publicly by a central ISO seems to
constitute a perfect framework for it to rise. Every market participant evaluates a tradeoff
between the immediate benefit from a free riding behavior and the future losses from the
competitive equilibrium. His decision will be a function of his discount rate between two
consecutive interactions; this discount rate will be extremely low in a framework where power
companies are bidding against each other every day (every half-hour in certain propositions).
Detection lags of price changes usually play an active role in hindering tacit collusion by
raising the benefit from defecting and reducing the incentives to collude because collusion is
based on the threat of retaliation and retaliation cannot occur before the detection of a
deviationo. With posted bids, the prices and quantities supplied are known immediately and
retaliation can take place with no delay.
Exceptional demand size encourages occasional free riding and hinders collusion;
because electric power can hardly be stored, no exceptional quantities can be traded on a short-
term market.
Forgiving trigger strategies might encourage free riding. The time lag between two
interactions is so small that even if renegotiations are possible to restore a collusion after an
occurrence of free riding, the renegotiation will not take place before the once-free-riding
company gets hurt by the competitive behavior it caused and no temporal defection followed by
renegotiation will take place.
Collusive behavior is usually very difficult to sustain in large systems because a very high
number of market participants with different characteristics increases, for some of them, the
incentives for defection" and any instability or irrational behavior spreads quickly to the whole
system by making the collusive behavior sub-optimal. In the market for electric power,
transmission constraints create geographical and temporal relevant sub-markets with reduced
'o With a fair number of competitors, keeping the bids hidden and releasing minimal information about prices may
encourage 'free riding' among generators and thus discourage collusion.
" See (Brock and Schneikman, 1985) for more details on the effect of the number of participants in Bertrand repeated
game with capacity limits
numbers of generators, sub-markets that are separated from each other's direct influence and
protected from any price collapse in another sub-market.
3. Imperfections in the financial markets
"When analyzing real time operations, there is a tendency to view the question of financial
transmission rights as a non-issue. After all, financial transmission capacity rights don't affect
economic dispatch, right? [...] That type of thinking, however, leads to erroneous conclusions"
(Ilic at al, 1997b).
Financial rights, used for hedging against transmission cost or for funding the grid
expansion, can create long term and short term detrimental incentives. This chapter reviews
some of the known detrimental incentives that financial instruments might give to the market
participants on the long term but shows also that they can also induce strategic bidding on the
short term, producing therefore a sub-optimal physical dispatch. This is especially true when the
revenues yielded by these financial instruments depend on the real flows through the
transmission network.
3.1 Introduction: the merchandising surplus
3.1.1 Existence and redistribution
Whatever the dispatching rules are, when a physical dispatch is efficient in the short term, the
congestion of the network produces a Merchandising Surplus (MS) which is a classical
congestion rent. This surplus is either implicitly redistributed (e.g., Berkeley model (Wu et al,
1995), see Section 3.2.2.2), or it is recovered by an ISO and must be reallocated explicitly in
some way. In the nodal prices proposal (Hogan, 1992), for example, the pricing mechanism
generates a merchandising surplus equal to (I -Pi. qi), where Pi is the nodal price and qi the
power injected at node i, and this surplus is strictly positive if a network is congested. Of course,
this merchandising surplus should not be allocated directly to the ISO because of the bad
incentives that this ISO would then have to raise this surplus by imposing a sub-optimal
dispatch. There are basically two proposed uses for this surplus, financing the capital cost of the
grid or hedging the market participants against transmission price risk.
3.1.2 Equity problems
The major problem that a regulator will have to face when choosing how to redistribute this
surplus remains a problem of equity. The redistribution of this surplus is a purely monetary
allocation choice and does not affect the social welfare in the short term (Ilic et al.,
1997a).12Thus, there is no unique neither fair way to do it, unless we consider the impact of this
allocation on the long-term efficiency, or the efficiency of the investments in generation, loads,
and transmission capacity. In the longer term, things are different, and allocation rules of the
surplus can help shape the market structure and thus the welfare. (See sections 3.3.2, 3.4).
3.2 An overview of financial rights
3.2.1 Roles offinancial rights
The existence of the merchandising surplus has promoted the introduction of financial rights in
many of the proposed models for deregulating the power industry. The first introduction of the
concept of financial right was partially motivated by a practical issue, redistributing a flow of
money that the ISO should not keep for itself, to keep it away from temptation. Nevertheless,
financial rights have an intrinsic value as potential policy instruments when designed carefully,
and offered by the right institution, i.e., not exclusively the ISO. Financial instruments have
basically two important potential roles to play in a deregulated market: hedging against the
market risk and giving appropriate incentives to stimulate an efficient expansion of the
transmission grid.
3.2.2 Types offinancial rights
3.2.2.1 Explicit financial rights
Financial rights can take a multitude of shapes. Two important types of explicit financial rights
that an ISO could distribute or sell are Link Based Rights and Transmission Congestion
Contracts.
In the Link Based Rights (LBR) approach (Oren et al, 1995) the owner of an LBR
receives a payment that compensates him for the difference of nodal prices between the two
nodes of that link (the transmission cost) times the real flow on the line joining those two nodes.
If the LBRs are allocated for all the transmission lines, the payments are equal to the surplus.
In the Transmission Congestion Contract approach (Hogan, 1992), the owner of a
contract (between two nodes that are not necessarily directly linked) receives a payment equal to
the difference in nodal prices times a contractual flow allocated ex-ante. If the allocated TCC
constitute a feasible dispatch, it has been proved that the total payment is, at the most, equal to
the merchandising surplus.
3.2.2.2 Implicit financial rights
However, financial rights, like physical rights, can be implicitly defined. In the Berkeley
approach (Wu et al., 1995), for example, the curtailment made by the ISO between the first and
the second period is in fact an implicit distribution of financial rights to the market participants.
It gives every one of them a financial revenue, redistributing exactly the merchandising surplus.
This revenue will depend on the way the curtailment is made (the financial right each one gets)
and the market conditions (clearing prices in the two phases and physical dispatch) (Ilic et al.
1997a). More generally, every market mechanism that optimizes the short term physical dispatch
2" Unless it is done in a way that gives incentives to deteriorate it: When this surplus is distributed to market participants
via financial rights, the market participants might in some cases have an incentive to adopt a strategic behavior that
could cause the physical dispatch to deviate from the efficient one in the short term. See Section 3.3.2.
will have a degree of freedom to redistribute in some way (implicit or explicit financial rights)
the surplus that will inevitably be generated.
3.3 Hedging instruments
3.3.1 Overview
The market participants may need to protect themselves against fluctuations in transmission cost.
This can be done with contracts from insurance agencies, but it raises the problem of how these
agencies will get the information they need about the market; this problem is of course
contingent to the proposed market model. It has also been proposed that the ISO could distribute
(part of) the MS as financial rights to hedge those that "deserve" it (Hogan, 1992). Nevertheless,
the types of financial rights that have been proposed to do this task (e.g., TCCs) hedge against
the fluctuation of the congestion on the market and the associated costs. They offer a second
order insurance as opposed to insurance that can be used against the fluctuation of the price of
power such as the contracts for differences. These types of rights not only reduce the variance of
transmission cost but also the expected price and are more re-distributive than hedging
instruments; and once again, there is no unique or even fair way to do this distribution in a non-
discriminatory way. Finally, and most importantly, it is frequently assumed that financial
hedging instruments will have no impact on the physical dispatch of power, i.e., the allocation of
physical rights. Nevertheless, many of the proposed hedging instruments (e.g., long term rigid
contracts) do have a serious impact on physical dispatch and thus on social welfare. An example
is given by the Rainbow Strawman proposal (Younes et al., 1997a, p18). More generally, any
financial hedging instrument whose revenue depends on the physical decisions of its owner (e.g.,
an option to buy at a given price), and is not tradable, is expected to have an influence on the
physical decisions of its owners. On the other hand, the existence of a market for those rights or
even the formal dissociation between the financial revenue of such rights and the short term
physical decisions of their owners (e.g., TCCs) do not guarantee that those rights have no
influence on the social welfare. Hedging instruments might give detrimental incentives to their
owners and encourage deviation from the optimal physical dispatch in the short term or
detrimental investments in the long term. In both cases, hedging instruments could have a
negative impact on the total welfare.
3.3.2 (Bad) incentives given by hedging instruments
We will show in the following sections that when those rights are allocated at no cost by an ISO
in order to redistribute the merchandising surplus, they can produce short or long term strategic
behavior and have a detrimental impact on social welfare 3. Depending on who gets the surplus,
and on the allocation procedure of financial rights, two categories of potential inefficiencies
could result: Long term inefficiency caused by detrimental investments in the grid, the generation
or the loads, and short term inefficiency due to the strategic behavior of the market participants
during the bidding process. We will use as an example the case of the nodal prices model and
two different financial instruments: TCCs and LBRs.
" Making the players pay for the hedging instruments they need can have a positive impact on the design of those rights,
as will be discussed in Section 4.2.1.1.
3.3.2. 1 Threats to short term efficiency
Hedging instruments whose revenues depend on the real flows on the network might induce sub-
optimal equilibrium.
On a market for electric power, where players are price takers, and where an appropriate
process makes the system converge to the socially optimal equilibrium in the absence of
financial rights, one of the generators wants to insure himself against the fluctuation of
congestion on the network. He pays PF to obtain a financial right F that will give him, when the
market clears, a revenue that will depend on the price he is paid, p, and on his output q'. q' is, a
priori, different from q*, the output he would have chosen if he had not bought F. Let this
revenue be RF(p,q').
The cost function of this player being C, his total revenue is:
(7) TR(F, q') = -C(q') + p -q'+RF(p, q') - PF
The player will choose the output q'(F) that maximizes TR; thus,
oC(q') oRF(p,q')(8) =-p+
If the revenue yielded by the financial right does not depend on the real injection
oRF( (Pi, q' (F)) = 0), the financial right will have no effect on the physical dispatch and
dt
q'=q*. Otherwise, the physical dispatch will be affected since the output q'(F) will shift away
from the socially optimal output q*.
We will examine as an illustration the case of the nodal prices model and the ownership
of Link Based Rights (LBRs). In the short run, a generator owning a LBR has incentives to
adopt a strategic behavior while bidding, even if he is a price taker, and thus, he might shift the
dispatch to a sub-optimal one. The following provides an example.






Competitive area, price P2 = 20
Figure 8: Financial instruments can affect short-term physical dispatch
Two competitive areas at nodes N1 and N2 are linked directly by a constrained
transmission line and indirectly through node N3. The two areas are large enough so that the
prices in these areas, P1 and P2, are not affected by node N3, and stay respectively at 10 and 20
units of cost. The ejections of power out of nodes N1 and N2 are ql and q2.
G' is a competitive aggregation of unconstrained generators at node N3. Its output q3'
depends only on the price at node 3, P3. G is a single generator that owns the LBR from node 3
to node 2, it output is q3.
Moreover, the three transmission lines have the same impedance.
It is easy to see that the price at node 3 will be P3 = 15 units of cost regardless of the
generating costs are at node 3. Moreover, P1, P2, P3 and q3' are independent of q3 and




The generator G is a price taker and he chooses his output q3 (by making the appropriate
bid) in order to maximize his revenue R. C being his cost function:
(11) R = P3.q3- C(q3) + (P2-P3).(1/3.ql + 2/3.(q3+q3'))
Thus, using (10),
oC(q3)(12) P3- +(P2-P3)*(1/2)=O.o13
oC(q3)His marginal cost is different from the price P3 and his output q3 is shifted away from
oa3
the socially optimal output because of the LBR.
Concerning TCCs, some of the short term inefficiencies have been highlighted by Oren
(Oren, 1997) who showed that if the competition among generators is a Cournot competition and
the nodal prices are defined ex-post, the generators will capture the value of the TCCs by
implicit collusion and, by doing so, might shift the dispatch toward a sub-optimal one. Even if
the competition is not a Cournot one, section 2.3.2 has shown that collusion might appear.
3.3.2.2 Threats to long term efficiency
Redistributing the merchandising surplus via financial rights can also produce long-term
inefficiencies, even if we assume that some regulation is preventing the generators from strategic
bidding and from creating short-term inefficiency.
An owner of a transmission right between two nodes with similar prices may have an
incentive to invest in a generator, which raises the transmission price between the two nodes and
thus increases his revenue from this right. His aggregated revenue might rise even if the
generator itself is losing money.
The following example gives an illustration:
Unconstrained area N1, Price P1
Thermal limit: 1000 Mw
N2, P2 - D: inelastic demand, 500 Mw
G: Competitive generators, 1400 Mw
Figure 9: Detrimental incentives for investment in generation capacity
The node N2 is not constrained and P2 = P1. If the owner of one of the generators in G
also owns the transmission right from node 2 to node 1, TCC or LBR, he might have an
incentive to build a new generating capacity of 200 MW, constraining the node 2 area in
generation, constraining the transmission, making P2 go under P1 and increasing the revenue
generated by the transmission right. The revenue generated by the transmission right might
exceed the losses of his generating capacity, at the expenses of the owners of the remaining
generation capacity at node 2.
3.4 Financial instruments to fund the grid
The expansion and enhancement of the grid must be funded and the merchandising surplus is
generated by the congestion of the grid. It seems natural to finance this expansion by that
surplus. Besides, when the expansion has to be made in a decentralized way, the surplus must be
broken down into financial rights that investors in the grid will receive as (part of) their
remuneration. When the merchandising surplus is not enough to finance this expansion, other
sources and other financial rights must be found and designed to finance this expansion. More
importantly, these rights should be designed in a fashion that gives the appropriate incentives to
ensure an efficient expansion of the grid.
As with the financial rights for hedging, one major concern should be the detrimental
incentives that the allocation of this surplus gives to the investors in the grid. If the investment is
centralized, the investor will have a clear incentive to create congestion and to raise the surplus if
the investor can appropriate the congestion rents. When investment in the grid is opened to
private initiative, the incentives given will depend on the allocation rule among the investors.
Stoft and Bushnell (1996) have proposed an elegant but impractical rule that should give the
right incentives to the investors, but no convincing general allocation mechanism has been
drafted so far for TCCs or LBRs.
Moreover, similar to what was described in the last sections, another bad incentive given
to the rights owners will be to encourage detrimental investments in the generation side. Also,
the owner of an ill designed financial right" will have an incentive to collude with neighboring
generators or load in order to maximize their joint profits, producing again a short term sub-
optimal dispatch. The two examples given for hedging instruments are still valid in the case of
financial instruments to fund the grid, in which case we could observe the same kind of
detrimental behavior.
14 See section 4.2.1.2 for definition
4. Using the transmission strategy to reduce
market imperfections
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that the transmission strategy the regulator will choose
can be used to reduce some of the imperfections that we have highlighted in the last chapters.
Both the rules on the physical market and the characteristics of the financial instruments that will
be designed can be very useful if chosen appropriately. One of the main messages is that the
incentives given by both physical and financial markets are correlated and that one market can be
designed to insure the efficiency of the other. We will see in this chapter how long term contracts
between generators, loads, and the transmission owners can hinder tacit collusion on the physical
market. It is also shown why the merchandising surplus should be used to fund the expansion of
the grid rather than to subsidize hedging instruments, these hedging instruments being more
efficient from a social welfare point of view if sold by an independent insurance agency. Most
importantly, it is also shown how a financial instrument to fund the expansion of the grid, if well
designed, can help reduce locational market power on the physical market.
4.1 Hindering tacit collusion on the physical market
4.1.1 Long term contracts hinder tacit collusion
Many factors affect the sustainability of tacit collusion: Detection lags of changes in prices,
asymmetries in cost structures between market participants, number of players, etc.
Most notably, the frequency of the interactions plays an essential role. As suggested by
Tirole (1988) and confirmed by Brock and Shneikman (1985) in the case where there exist
production capacity constraints, the discount rate between two interactions is an essential
stability factor of collusive behavior because every participant evaluates a tradeoff between
immediate benefits and the future cost of non-cooperation, and a larger discount rate always
diminishes the value of future retaliation. One way to hinder collusion is therefore to change the
discount factor between two interactions by changing the frequency of these interactions.
Making the interaction less frequent raises this rate and might prevent collusion. It seems
reasonable that while bidding every half hour could discourage free-riding and make collusion
sustainable, long term contracts (5 to 20 years) imply a very large discount rate that might
discourage, in turn, collusive behavior.
To illustrate this claim, we consider again the infinitely repeated game between N
generators developed in section 2.3.2. It is clear from (6) that the period T between two
interactions will determine whether the trigger strategy is a Nash strategy and whether we are
likely to observe tacit collusion at the monopoly price. Moreover, it is possible to choose T in
order to make the trigger strategy not sustainable for all values of k and N for which this strategy
yields a different outcome than the one stage equilibrium. This period, T ,,, should satisfy:
1 D(N,k)- C(N,k)(13) < min
exp(rTmin)-I k,N\k>a-c C(N,k)- B(N,k)
2N
This minimum, for N fixed, is met for
(14) k= a - c
N
Then,
(15) min D(N,k)- C(N,k) n N(15) min = min -1
a-c C(N, k)- B(N, k) N- 1k,N\k>--
2N
Implying
(16) Tmin > In(2)
r
In other words, for any number of generators of any size facing any linear demand, and
for a discount rate of 10%, contracts for delivery of electric power during 7 years or more should
always help hinder collusive behavior. Of course this strong result gives only an order of
magnitude, and more realistic data should be collected to analyze this phenomenon and
determine Tmin with non linear demand, increasing and asymmetric marginal cost functions and
a potential "supply function" competition scheme.
4.1.2 Collusion issues to be investigated
In order to prevent collusion, other factors have to be investigated and their impact on collusive
behavior clarified.
Dynamics of collusion: How does collusive behavior evolve in a deregulated power industry?
Under what circumstances could a system that has deviated from collusive behavior return to the
previous equilibrium? Understanding these mechanisms will enable us to design an appropriate
structure that makes collusive behavior non-sustainable.
Amalgamation of prices in constrained zones and dynamics of global collusion: It would be
interesting to use the techniques introduced by Simon (Simon et al., 1961) to amalgamate the
collusion level in every constrained zone. It will enable us to study how the global level of
collusion between weakly linked constrained zones could converge to an equilibrium in the long
term. A better knowledge of these mechanisms could provide us with some strategies to prevent
this phenomenon.
4.2 Incentives given by the financial markets
4.2.1 Sources offinancial rights
4.2. 1. 1 Funding the expansion of the transmission network
The merchandising surplus, existent in all the proposed market mechanisms that attempt an
optimal dispatch explicitly or implicitly, could be used to (partially) fund the capital cost for
expanding the grid (Lecinq et al., 1997). The main advantage would be to reduce the fixed and
variable charges of transmission that have to be collected from the market participants. We know
from economic theory that those charges will inevitably produce distortions in the social welfare
if they do not correspond to variable costs. Using the merchandising surplus to allocate financial
rights to hedge against congestion pricing would, at best, lead to a pure monetary allocation that
does not affect the global efficiency of the system or the social welfare. Using it to finance the
grid will help reduce the necessary variable charges that have to be taxed to system users and, by
doing so, reduce the economic distortion and increase the social welfare.
It will be interesting to investigate how the additional charges, that will be collected if the
merchandising surplus does not yield enough revenue, must be designed to minimize their
impact on the social welfare. It is known that if the "optimal" solution includes necessarily fixed
charges, this solution is impractical for occasional wheeling transactions. It might be useful to
have the ISO propose different choices of charges (variable vs. fixed) to the market participants
from which every one will pick the type that will suit him the most.
Furthermore, one should not forget that the grid already exists and the major part of its
cost has already been depreciated". Could the dynamic nature of the expansion of the grid allow
us to finance completely the capital cost of the marginal expansion from the surplus produced by
the whole grid? The answer will depend on the celerity of the expansion, the chosen depreciation
time frame and on the real lifetime of a transmission line. In any case, if this is possible, we will
have found a source of financing totally the expansion of the grid in a socially optimal way.
4.2. 1.2 Who should sell or distribute hedging instruments?
We will designate as ill designed those financial rights that give detrimental incentives, from a
total welfare point of view, to their owner - or induce "Moral Hazard". We have seen in section
3.3.2 that TCCs and LBRs can be, in certain conditions, considered as ill designed financial
rights.
"Insurance Agencies Will Not Sell Ill Designed Rights." This provocative statement is
true under the strict assumptions that the insurance companies have enough information to know
the expected value of the rights they are selling, the insurance market is competitive, and the
market participants maximize their expected profits, i.e., they are neutral to risk.
In this framework, the two first assumptions indicate that the price of the rights will be
equal to their expected value. The third assumption makes the market participant choose to buy
this right by comparing his expected revenue when he buys the right and when he do not. The
expected value of the right being offset by its price, he must compare his direct physical market
benefits from the actions he will take in the two cases. Therefore, he will not buy an ill designed
right that will make him deviate from the simple behavior of maximizing the benefits from the
real transactions of power.
"5 The remaining fixed cost is presently being recovered through a fixed Regional Network Service (RNS).
The example introduced in 3.3.2.1 illustrates this claim. If the financial right F is sold by
an insurance company that have enough information to know the expected values of the rights it
is selling, and if the insurance market is competitive, it is clear that price PF of F is equal to
E(RF(p,q')), the expected value of the revenue yielded by F.
The expected revenue of this player is therefore:
(17) E(TR(F)) = -E(C(q'(F)) + p.q'i(F))
Supposing that the revenue of F depends on the output (it is therefore ill designed as
shown in 3.3.2.1) and therefore q' q*, q* being the optimal choice of the player in the absence
of financial rights, we have:
(18) -C(q') + p -(q') < -C(q*) + p - (q*),
therefore,
(19) E(-C(q') + p (q')) < E(-C(q*) + p (q*)),
or,
(20) E(TR(F)) < E(TR(O)).
In other words, the insurance contracted by the player i ex-ante (before the market clears)
leads him to a sub-optimal output ex-post (when his price is known) and the expected outcome of
this insurance is offset by its price. Therefore, the player will not take an insurance whose
outcome depends on his real injection, and the insurance companies should not propose such an
insurance.
Of course this is an extreme case and the problem of moral hazard exists because firms
are never perfectly neutral to risk (or we would not need hedging instruments) and the
information that an insurance company obtains about the market can always be manipulated.
Besides, the capacity of a player without market power (a player who cannot influence nodal
prices) to influence the flows is not straightforward. Nevertheless, we have seen that when the
ISO is distributing rather than selling financial rights, the problem of moral hazard exists even
under the assumptions we have made. Moreover, it seems intuitive, but has not yet been proven
here, that for a degree of aversion to risk, the market participants might choose the financial
instrument that produces the lesser degree of moral hazard. Besides, private insurance agencies
are not bound by any budget constraint and have the technical and financial ability to propose
much more sophisticated financial instruments to market participants that feel the need to hedge
their revenue against fluctuations of transmission cost. We should note that, in this context, those
financial instruments can be combined with other financial instruments to hedge against
fluctuations of the price of electricity itself.
To summarize, the financial rights allocated at no cost to the market participants can
produce bad incentives in both the short and long terms. Allowing market participants to buy
financial instruments from insurance agencies can be much more efficient because the market
participants internalize the expected revenues of those contracts by paying their price. It can be
shown, for example, that no transmission contract that shifts ex-post the real dispatch from the
optimal one will be bought (under certain assumptions). Another argument is that the
instruments proposed by an insurance agency can be much more sophisticated and efficient than
those an ISO could propose.
4.2.2 Allocation offinancial rights
4.2.2.1 Is a decentralized investment in the grid feasible? (or the virtue of ex-ante
remuneration)
The regulator will choose between a centralized and a decentralized investment scheme. The
decentralized scenario should yield more efficient results than the centralized scenario because
of the assumed virtues of concurrence. Nevertheless, to achieve this, we will have to design the
financial rights and mechanisms to remunerate private investors that will internalize the network
externalities without falling in the same kind of inefficiencies we described for hedging financial
rights. This is not an easy task, but one possible approach would be to design financial
instruments that yield a revenue that is a function of the characteristics of the market ex-ante and
of the proposed project; and not of the conditions ex-post as it has been proposed until now, e.g.,
TCCs or LBRs, because of the detrimental incentives (moral hazard) that the latter could give to
the investor.
Another approach would be to allow more than one investor to participate in building one
line in a competitive way to resolve the problem of economies of scale and natural monopoly.
Some work has been done in this direction (Braman) but the proposed model induces only a
second-best solution because of the obligation given to the merchandising surplus to finance
completely the expansion and this approach might not be better than a centralized investment by
an ISO. Further research should investigate optimal solutions that use fixed and variable charges
for transmission to provide a balanced budget for an optimal level of investment.
4.2.2.2 Grid expansion strategies for reducing locational market power (or the virtue of
ex-ante remuneration, (2))
Hindering collusion is not sufficient to ensure a competitive market. As we have seen in section
2.3.2, even a simple Bertrand competition is likely to give-non competitive outcomes in the
relevant sub-markets. A more global strategy is needed to eliminate, or at least decrease, the
locational market power created on the physical market by congestion. Price caps and the
multiplication of ownership might certainly be useful but have the side effects and limitations
discussed in the conclusion. A more natural strategy would be to eliminate the cause of
locational market power, i.e., transmission congestion, via a network expansion, or, even better,
via the threat of network expansion. An expansion policy for the grid that takes into
consideration the used market power in relevant sub-markets (e.g., via the prices that generators
ask for) could constitute a credible threat against the use of market power. The credibility of the
threat seems to be linked to the use of ex-ante characteristics of the market to remunerate the
investors. For example, an expansion strategy that would yield the appropriate financial revenues
to link two nodes whose electricity prices are sufficiently different when the investment is
decided, and not after the line is built, could discourage generators at the expensive node from
abusing their market power. By not raising their prices too much, they will stay separated from
the unconstrained area and benefit from the modest rents that this strategy gives them 6.
To illustrate how a grid expansion policy that is a function of ex-ante conditions on the
market can reduce the market power of the market participants, we have made a second
simulation on the IEEE reliability system. Using the same software as in section 2.2, we are able
16 Nevertheless, because of environmental considerations, new lines cannot always be built and this impossibility
reduces the credibility of the threat. Investment in Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS) devices could help
reestablish this credibility.
to estimate the optimal expansion for the lines 7 and 14 through 17 under the peak load pricing
method (Lecinq and Ilic, 1997; Macan, 1997)17. This capacity is a function of the costs of
expansion, the demand functions, and, most importantly, the bids that the generators are making.
It is noteworthy that in this model the generators are giving their bids before the expansion of the
line is decided; i.e., the expansion policy of the grid depends on ex-ante characteristics of the
market and behavior of the market participants. To analyze how the expansion can affect the
market power, we have added a fourth demand level, greater than the former three. Furthermore,
the original capacities of the five critical lines were set to their optimal values determined by the
peak load pricing method when all the generators are bidding their real cost function in the four
demand levels. We have then made the generators that are at nodes 1, 2 and 7 (that we have
shown to form a relevant market) raise all together their bids by 10% in the four demand levels.
This was done in the two scenarios where we allow or not further expansion of the transmission
lines 7 and 14 through 17. The following two tables summarize the increases in prices and profits
that this 10% increase in bidding has produced in the two cases.
Demand PRICES Ranges of profits Total Aggregated
level Node 1 Node 2 Node 7 Ranges for other nodes at nodes 1, 2, 7 profits
1 1.4% 0.9% 1.6% 1.2% to 0.6% 0% to 2.9%
2 3.3% 3.4% 2.6% -0.2% to 1.7% 0% to 8.4% + 21%
3 10.2% 10.0% 10.1% -0.9% to 0.1% 24.5% to 45.1%
4 10.8% 10.6% 9.5% -1.3% to 1% 19% to 32.3%
Table 3. Changes In Prices And Profits When Expansion Is Not Allowed.
Demand PRICES Ranges of profits Total Aggregated
level Node 1 Node 2 Node 7 Ranges for other nodes at nodes 1, 2, 7 profits
1 1.4% 1.1% 1.8% 0.5% to 1.8% 0% to 3.6%
2 1.4% 1.5% 1.2% 0.5% to 1.2% 0% to 2.6% +1%
3 3.3% 3.1% 3.1% 3.3% to 3.7% 6.3% to 10.7%
4 -0.4% -0.5% 0.3% 1.2% to 3.2% -3.2% to -0.3%
Table 4: Changes In Prices And Profits When Expansion Is Allowed.
When colluding together and raising their bids by 10%, and when the transmission
capacity is fixed to its "optimal" value, the five generators at nodes 1, 2, and 7 are able to raise
their cumulated profits by 21%. If we allow the transmission lines to expand accordingly to the
bids of these generators, the same increase in bidding raises the cumulated profits by less than
1%, some of the generators being worse off. The studied sub-market can no longer be qualified
as relevant, individual locational market power is seriously weakened and cartelisation is not
sustainable. It is noteworthy that, in these conditions, non-competitive bids are therefore unlikely
to be observed, as is an effective expansion of the grid. The threat of a transmission grid
17 In the peak load pricing method, the expansion of the transmission lines and the nodal prices are calculated to
maximize the total social welfare taking into consideration the generation price and the consumers surplus (as in
Hogan's nodal pricing approach (1992)) as well as the capital cost of the grid expansion (as distinct from the Hogan
approach). It is interesting that the nodal prices given by the peak load pricing are the same as those the Hogan nodal
pricing calculations would give when the line capacities are set at the optimal values given by the peak load pricing
method.
expansion is sufficient to remove the market power of the generators and alter the relevant
character of the sub-market formed at nodes 1, 2 and 7.
4.2.2.3 Transitional period
As we have seen, on the short term, the distribution of the merchandising surplus via financial
rights, if well designed, will only be a financial allocation without an impact on social welfare. In
a transition period, we could use it to reduce the stranded cost of the old generators by
distributing these financial rights to those generators. This can be justified by the fact that those
generators have contributed to the construction of the existing grid and that they could be
entitled, at least in a transition period, to whatever revenues this grid is generating, and giving
them those revenues will not affect the overall efficiency. We will nevertheless be scarifying the
benefits from using this surplus to finance the expansion of the grid. We have to compare the
relative size of this surplus and of the stranded costs to see if it would be worthwhile to make the
necessary political efforts to implement such a strategy.
5. Policy Analysis
5.1 Classical solutions to fight market power
As shown in this thesis, locational market power in general, and tacit collusive behavior in
particular, threaten seriously the social welfare in the future deregulated power industry and must
be treated as such when designing a regulatory framework for this deregulation.
The problems of global and locational market power have frequently been evoked in
recent economic literature and sometimes used to offer counter-examples in the debate over the
deregulation of the electric power industry. However, they have rarely been directly taken into
consideration in the different general proposals that have been made so far for deregulating this
industry. It is often thought that these problems can be treated independently from the general
framework of the future market rules. As reported by Joskow (1996), two methods are usually
proposed to reduce market power. They consist in imposing price caps or multiplying the
ownership of the generators.
However, imposing price caps does not eliminate the market power but reduces its
expression. When significant market power does exist, the prices will remain at the maximum
authorized by the caps and the regulator will be virtually setting himself the transaction prices in
peak periods by setting the maximum price cap. Such a practice can lead us closer to mandatory
pricing than to true competition during these period and gives a very high discretionary power to
the regulator. Moreover, high prices during peak periods can be a useful and legitimate economic
signal to build marginal generation capacity needed for reliability. It will be very difficult for the
regulator to make the difference between the abuse of locational market power in peak period
and very high but legitimate prices, useful to reimburse the capital cost of the marginal
production units.
On the other hand, multiplying ownership is a useful solution to reduce the global
market power that utilities might have because of their total size, independently of transmission
constraints. Nevertheless, it might not help reducing locational market power created by
transmission constraints since some of the local and temporal relevant markets may not be
sufficiently large to enable this multiplication. Multiplying artificially the number of firms can
be detrimental to the social welfare as shown by Baumol (1982) in his theory of contestable
markets. Furthermore, as shown by Brock and Shneikman (1985), on a market where market
players with production capacity constraints are playing an infinitely repeated price competition
game (or Bertrand supergames), increasing the number of firms has a non monotonic and thus
ambiguous effect on collusion because raising the number of firms first encourages collusion by
raising the losses incurred during a price war before hindering collusion by raising the relative
profits of a defector.
5.2 Policy recommendations advocated by this thesis
It is my opinion that the problems raised by locational market power and its corollary, tacit
collusion, cannot be resolved using artificial tools that ignore the specificities of this market. The
solution should rather be an integral part of any proposal that pretends to produce an efficient
market. This thesis has shown how long term contracts can help hinder tacit collusive behavior
by encouraging free riding. It has also shown how, more generally, locational market power can
be decreased through an expansion policy of the transmission grid that depends on the ex-ante
behavior of the market participants, and other characteristics of the market, and that would
expand the weak links when locational market power is abused. It has shown why such an
expansion policy can produce the appropriate threats against the market participants, decreasing
drastically their market power, without necessarily producing any real expansion of the
transmission grid. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that an expansion policy that relies on ex-
ante characteristics of the market can also help prevent detrimental strategic behavior of
investors in the grid and in generation capacity. It is also recommended that the merchandising
surplus should finance partially this strategy, while the financial hedging instruments must rather
be designed and sold by insurance agencies independently of the system operator in order to
minimize their impact on short term physical markets.
5.3 Implementation of the policy recommendation
The practical implementation of the majority of the recommendations seems feasible. A long-
term market, competing with the spot market, exists already in UK and in the majority of the
other deregulated electric power markets. If it is true that such a market is excluded from the
purest approach to nodal pricing, in practice, even California, the market that will probably be
the closest in its approach to nodal pricing, is very likely to allow long term contracts between
producers and consumers"8. As for who should design and sell the hedging instruments,
forbidding the ISO to distribute TCCs or other types of hedging instruments should not be
problematic as this is only a proposal that has been incorporated in the first approaches to nodal
pricing by Hogan (1992) and that was never implemented. The merchandising surplus that was
to be distributed using these instruments can be usefully and easily used to fund partially the cost
of the transmission grid. It is instead recommended to have an insurance agency, a bank of any
profit maximizing firm (the producers for example) do this job. This is the way hedging
instruments are sold in any classical market and it will be implemented automatically as a
consequence of forbidding the ISO to distribute hedging instrument.
The implementation of an expansion strategy for the transmission grid that would yield
credible threats to those abusing their market power could be, in some situations, more difficult.
The ultimate degree of deregulation would be achieved when the investments in the transmission
network are done in an uncoordinated way by independent investors owning the lines they build
and earning benefits from operating these lines. In that case, the remuneration of this investor
depends only on the ex-post congestion of the network (e.g., Transmission Congestion
Contracts). An investment that would reduce congestion and eliminate the abuse of market
power might not yield enough revenues to the investors and the threat of such an investment
would not be credible. Nevertheless, there are very few proposed methods that could send
appropriate signals for investment in transmission and there are even fewer methods that can do
it for decentralized investors. The most elaborated one, proposed by Bushnell and Stoft (1996),
" As confirmed by several utilities delegates at the 18th IAEE conference (Sep. 97, San Francisco)
rely on Transmission Congestion Contracts that would be distributed to the investors following
to a feasibility rule. This proposal would yield correct incentives to the investors under
restrictive conditions. However, when these conditions are not met, market participants might
find it profitable to make alterations in the transmission grid that are detrimental to the system.
Most likely, the expansion of the transmission grid will be undertaken by an independent, but
regulated, centralized operator or by those that are benefiting directly from the transmission
network: Utilities and distribution companies. In England and Wales for example, the
transmission is controlled, managed, and its expansions are planned by the National Grid
Company (NGC). The NGC is jointly owned by the regional distribution companies though
recently these companies have considered divesting their shares in NGC and making it an
independent company. Nevertheless, NGC remains tightly regulated and it is required to
facilitate competition and meet user's reasonable requests for connection to the system (Green,
1997). Implementing an expansion strategy similar to that recommended in this report is
relatively easy and could be done through the regulations binding this company. Specifying,
through these regulations, that the NGC have to build new lines when locational market power is
abused would give to the threat of expansion the needed credibility. In the future deregulated
California market, the transmission lines are owned by the Utilities and the ISO may have no
financial interest in any transmission facility. Under a proposal submitted by California's three
largest investor-owned electric utilities to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the
transmission owners would have an obligation to build transmission facilities the ISO decides are
needed for economy or reliability (Burkhart, 1997). Implementing the expansion strategy
proposed here in the California market will only require the ISO to have a transparent policy for
expansion of the network that would specify that such an expansion will take place when
locational market power is abused. Finally a very interesting case is New Zealand, where the
system is very close to the spot pricing method and Trans Power, a state owned utility is
responsible for operating the transmission system and for planning expansions. System
expansions are justified if the difference in prices with and without a line equals the cost of the
line (Green, 1997). This system might very well yield appropriate and credible threats against
abuses of market power that would raise some nodal prices and justify new investments.
Nevertheless, the market-based rule used by the industry is that investment should only be done
if a coalition of users is willing to pay for it. The problems of free riding could alter the
credibility of the threat.
6. Conclusion: Limitations and future
research
We have seen how an expansion strategy that yields appropriate threats can reduce locational
market power. Defining explicitly such an expansion policy must be the next objective of further
research. This policy must meet two goals. (1) It should first induce, ex-ante, credible threats
against the abuses of market power. (2) It must also produce, ex-post, a transmission network
that has the appropriate dimensions. Moreover, it must also acknowledge the technical,
environmental, and financial constraints.
In order to achieve the second goal, the threats of over-building the network must be
dissuasive enough so that it has only to be rarely executed. However, due to technical
constraints, the time needed to build a new line might be significant enough to make it
worthwhile for a market participant to raise the market prices even if.a new line will be build,
reducing therefore the dissuasive power of the threat. Moreover, environmental constraints could
make it unlikely to build new transmission lines on certain locations, reducing the credibility of
the threat of expansion.
It seems that FACTS devices might be used to restore the credibility and the dissuasive power
of the threat because their installation can be less time and capital consuming and more
environmentally friendly than building physical transmission lines.
Funding the expansion strategy can also be a serious concern since no threat is credible, and
no needed transmission capacity can be built when the needed funds are not available. The
transmission costs paid by the market participants, or at least their expected value, must be
sufficient to cover the capital cost of the grid and to remunerate the investors. If there is, as many
authors agree, economies of scale in the transmission of electric power, pricing at the marginal
cost will not yield enough revenues to cover the costs and some additional charges must be paid
in order to equilibrate the budget. These charges ought to be chosen in a way that minimizes the
economic distortions that they create. A good candidate would be to use a method similar to the
voluntary price discrimination used by the insurance companies. Different combinations of fixed
and variable charges from which they would have to choose can be proposed to the market
participants.
Finally, once the problems of credibility and funding resolved, one still have to determine
how the investment decisions will be taken, who will execute them, how would he be paid for
them (as distinct from how to get the money to pay him), and who will own the physical lines.
When the regulator decides that a centralized and regulated body (e.g., an ISO) will own and
develop the network, designing an expansion strategy that has the characteristics described above
can be (relatively) easy since the regulations that bind this body will give it the power to make
his threats credible. Nevertheless, if the regulator chooses to go a step further and allow
decentralized investments in the transmission network, an independent and unregulated investor
would not execute a project unless he is expecting benefits. If the remuneration of this investor
depends only on the ex-post congestion of the network, the threat of investment will not be
credible. Future research should try to find a mechanism that would create a credible threat of
individual investors over-building the network when market power is abused, while producing,
ex-post, a well designed but competitively built network. This is definitely one of the most
challenging goals to be achieved in this field.
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